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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article surveys significant developments in intellectual property (IP) law 
during the past year (i.e., 2013 or the Survey Period).1 While this article focuses 
on case law that is precedential in the Fifth Circuit, it also reviews IP law 
developments that are likely to be influential in the evolution of Texas IP 
jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Federal Circuits. For 
developments in copyright and trademark law, the Fifth Circuit’s authority is 
binding, but other circuits, such as the Second and the Ninth, are considered 
highly persuasive. Because all cases concerning a substantive issue of patent law 
are appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, decisions 
from that court during the Survey period are included in this article. 
The U.S. Supreme Court was quite active in the IP field since the last Survey 
period (i.e., 2012) ended, deciding five cases involving IP issues2 and granting 
writs of certiorari on nine others.3 In patents, the Court showed particular 
interest in what qualifies as patentable subject matter.4 The Court also 
considered whether patent exhaustion applies to self-replicating seeds5 and 
granted certiorari to consider divided patent infringement.6 The Court 
considered other issues including whether federal jurisdiction extends to patent 
malpractice claims7 and whether “reverse payment” settlements are immune 
from antitrust attack.8 The Federal Circuit also made important developments 
to its patent law jurisprudence.9 Additionally, Congress enacted the Patent Law 
 
 1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors and are not 
necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients. 
 2. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 
1062 (2013); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110–11 (2013); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1354 (2013). 
 3. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 734 (2013); Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014); Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. 
App’x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 49 (2013); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health 
Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013); Petrella v. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013); 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 695 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); Limelight Networks, 
Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014); 
Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 
(2014); WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 576 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. ABC, 
Inc. v. Aero, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014). 
 4. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111. 
 5. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1764. 
 6. See Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d at 1305. 
 7. See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062. 
 8. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
 9. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Robert Bosch, 
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Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, which brings the United States in 
alignment with the Hague Agreement Concerning International Registration of 
Industrial Designs and the Patent Law Treaty.10 
In copyright, the U.S. Supreme Court decided whether the first sale doctrine 
applies to copyrighted material that is published abroad, sold abroad, and then 
imported into the United States.11 A federal district court determined whether 
Google’s scanning, storage, and display of millions of books falls within the “fair 
use” defense to copyright infringement.12 In trademark, the Fifth Circuit 
confirmed that the defense of laches can preclude a comprehensive injunction 
against an infringer.13 The enactment of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
which clarifies and changes trade secret law in Texas, is perhaps more 
significant.14 
II.  PATENT UPDATE 
A.  THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS 
1.  A Closer Look at Reverse Payment Agreements—Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, 
Inc. 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered 
whether the monopoly rights associated with a patent should shield a reverse 
payment agreement from antitrust attack.15 A reverse payment, or pay-for-delay 
settlement agreement, is an agreement that involves a patentee paying the 
alleged patent infringer.16 This is unusual because the majority of settlements 
involve the alleged infringer paying the patentee.17 These agreements are 
common among pharmaceutical companies and are often characterized as 
agreements that keep less-expensive generic drugs off the shelves.18 In a highly 
anticipated decision that raised uncertainty in the pharmaceutical industry, the 
Court held that reverse payment settlements are not immune from antitrust 
attack and should be evaluated using the rule of reason test that is ordinarily 
applied to antitrust cases.19 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals owns a patent covering AndroGel®, which was the 
 
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Raylon LLC v. Complus Data 
Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 10. See Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, § 201, Pub. L. 112-211, 126 Stat. 
1531. 
 11. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013). 
 12. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 13. Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 626 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
88 (2013). 
 14. See Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 134A.001 
et seq. (2013). 
 15. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227, 2237 (2013). 
 16. Id. at 2227. 
 17. See id. at 2231. 
 18. Id. at 2227; Edward Wyatt, Supreme Court Lets Regulators Sue Over Generic Drug Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/business/supreme-court-says-drug-
makers-can-be-sued-over-pay-for-delay-deals.html?_r=o. 
 19. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227, 2237. 
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first branded drug to receive FDA approval for gel-based testosterone 
replacement therapy.20 Using an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, Actavis, Inc. (then known as Watson 
Pharmaceuticals) requested FDA approval of a generic version of AndroGel®.21 
Actavis also certified in its application that Solvay’s patent covering AndroGel® 
was invalid.22 Solvay then sued Actavis for patent infringement, and Actavis 
responded with a patent invalidity claim.23 Later, Actavis and Solvay settled and 
entered into multiple settlement agreements. Solvay agreed to dismiss the 
infringement action, and Actavis agreed to not market its generic product for 
nine years.24 Actavis also agreed to market AndroGel® in exchange for a portion 
of the gel’s profits.25 Based on these agreements, Actavis expected to receive 
between $15 and $30 million per year from Solvay.26 
The FTC filed suit, claiming the settlement agreements violated antitrust laws 
because Solvay was paying Actavis to not compete with AndroGel®.27 The 
federal district court applied the “scope-of-the-patent” approach, which includes 
examining “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the 
extent to which the agreements exceeded that scope; and (3) the resulting 
anticompetitive effects.”28 Because the FTC did not allege that the settlement 
agreements exceeded the scope of Solvay’s patent, the district court dismissed 
the FTC’s complaint.29 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the evaluation of reverse payment 
agreements for antitrust violations would be difficult administratively.30 
Antitrust claims often hinge on the validity of a patent, which would create a 
patent validity case-within-a-case for each antitrust claim.31 The Eleventh Circuit 
also noted that, as a matter of public policy, settlement agreements are generally 
favored.32 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the FTC argued that reverse payment 
agreements are presumptively unlawful.33 Therefore, the agreement should be 
evaluated using the “quick look” approach, in which the defendant bears the 
burden of showing that the agreement provides some countervailing 
procompetitive effects.34 Actavis argued that a reverse payment agreement 
should be evaluated using the “scope-of-the-patent” approach, in which the 
 
 20. Id. at 2229. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. In re Androgel Antitrust Lit. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1374–75 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
 24. Id. at 1375. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1375–76. 
 28. Id. at 1377. 
 29. Id. at 1379. 
 30. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1313–15 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2230. 
 33. Brief for Petitioner at 33, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-
416). 
 34. Id. 
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agreement must exceed the exclusionary potential of a patent.35 Actavis also 
noted that a ruling severely limiting settlement options would chill settlements 
and could result in less innovation from drug manufacturers.36 
The Supreme Court rejected both proposed approaches and noted that 
anticompetitive effects must be measured against patent law policy as well as 
antitrust policies.37 It held that a reverse agreement should be evaluated under 
the “rule of reason” test that is ordinarily applied in antitrust cases.38 
Five considerations were given in support of adopting the “rule of reason” 
approach.39 First, reverse settlement agreements potentially create a “genuine 
adverse effects on competition.”40 It is possible that the patentee pays the patent 
challenger to abandon its very strong patent invalidity claim so that both 
patentee and patent challenger share the monopoly profits.41 In this situation, 
the consumer loses.42 Second, the “rule of reason” test allows an antitrust 
defendant to justify any anticompetitive consequences that may result from a 
reverse settlement agreement.43 Legitimate justifications may be that the 
payment amount is roughly equivalent to litigation costs, exchanged for services, 
or related to other traditional settlement considerations.44 Third, when 
unjustified anticompetitive harm is possible, the patentee likely possesses the 
market power and financing to bring about the harm.45 Fourth, evaluating a 
reverse settlement agreement for antitrust violations should be less difficult than 
the Eleventh Circuit describes.46 That is, it would not be normally “necessary to 
litigate the patent validity [in order] to answer the antitrust question.”47 Instead, 
the Court suggests that a “large” payment would, in itself, suggest that the 
patentee seriously doubts the patent’s validity.48 Fifth, lawsuits will still be settled 
even if large, unjustified reverse payment settlements are now susceptible to 
antitrust attack.49 The Court notes that instead of large payments, the parties 
could negotiate for the generic brand to enter the market prior to the patent’s 
expiration.50 
The often described “amorphous” rule of reason approach involves 
determining “whether the restraint imposed . . . merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it . . . may suppress or even destroy 
 
 35. Brief for Respondent at 13–21, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 
12-416). 
 36. Id. at 44–45. 
 37. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
 38. Id. at 2227. 
 39. Id. at 2234–37. 
 40. Id. at 2234 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 41. Id. at 2234–35. 
 42. Id. at 2235. 
 43. Id. at 2235–36. 
 44. Id. at 2236. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 2237. 
 50. Id. 
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competition.”51 Generally, a court should consider “the facts peculiar to the 
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; and the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or 
probable.”52 It was left to the lower courts to tailor the rule of reason analysis for 
reverse payment settlement agreements, but the Court does state that factors to 
be considered are “likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market 
power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the 
circumstances.”53 Additionally, the likelihood of anticompetitive effects will 
depend upon the size of the reverse payment, payment size compared to future 
litigation costs, its independence from “other services for which it might 
represent payment,” and the absence of any other convincing justification.54 
Three justices dissented, noting that the “scope-of-the-patent” test properly 
separates patent and antitrust law, with exceptions involving sham litigation and 
fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office.55 The dissent noted that the “rule of 
reason” test could require the lower courts to determine the validity of the 
patent, which would involve costly and lengthy litigation.56 Additionally, the 
dissent argued that the majority’s holding discourages settlement of patent 
litigation and fails to recognize that patent law also protects consumer interest 
by providing protection against competition.57 
How the Court’s decision will affect the pharmaceutical industry’s use of 
reverse payment agreements is currently unknown. However, Actavis concedes 
that the Court’s holding will result in an “additional and unnecessary 
administrative burden” on the pharmaceutical industry.58 With little guidance 
on how the rule of reason test will be implemented, the pharmaceutical industry 
will be watching closely for case law developments. 
2.  The Proper Home for a Case-Within-a-Case—Gunn v. Minton 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), federal courts have exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction over cases “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”59 
In Gunn v. Minton, the Supreme Court considered whether a state malpractice 
claim involving the handling of a patent case fell within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).60 Vernon Minton developed a computer 
program known as the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN), which 
he leased to a securities brokerage.61 Over a year later, Minton filed a patent 
 
 51. FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (quoting Bd. of Trade of City of 
Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)). 
 52. Bd. of Trade of City of Chic., 246 U.S. at 238. 
 53. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
 54. Id. at 2237. 
 55. Id. at 2239. 
 56. Id. at 2245. 
 57. Id. at 2245–46. 
 58. Press Release, Actavis, U.S. Supreme Court Reverses U.S. Court of Appeals Decision in 
FTC. v. Actavis (June 17, 2013), available at http://ir.actavis.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=65778&p=irol-
newsArticle_pf&ID=1830404. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
 60. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1062, 1065 (2013). 
 61. Id. 
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application that was substantially based on TEXCEN.62 Upon receiving a patent, 
Minton—represented by Jerry Gunn—filed a patent infringement suit against the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the NASDAQ Stock 
Market, Inc. (NASDAQ).63 Gunn was not aware of the lease of TEXCEN at that 
time.64 At trial, NASDAQ moved for summary judgment and argued that the 
lease of TEXCEN violated the “on sale” bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and 
therefore, Minton’s patent was invalid.65 Minton tried to distinguish between 
the patented system and TEXCEN, but the district court granted the summary 
judgment motion and held that the patent was invalid.66 Afterward, Minton 
obtained new counsel and filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the 
lease fell within the “experimental use” exception to the on-sale bar.67 The 
motion was denied, with the district court holding that the experimental use 
argument was waived.68 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision.69 
Minton, believing that this waiver resulted in the invalidation of his patent 
and the loss of his $100 million damages claim against NASDAQ, filed a 
malpractice claim against Gunn in Texas state court.70 Liability under the 
malpractice claim hinged on the causation element and whether the lease was, 
in fact, for an experimental purpose.71 The Texas trial court found that Minton 
could provide no evidence supporting the experimental purpose argument and 
granted summary judgment to Gunn.72 Minton then filed an appeal and argued 
that his malpractice claim actually belonged in federal court because it “arose 
under exclusive federal patent law jurisdiction.”73 The Texas Court of Appeals 
applied the Grable test, which provides that federal jurisdiction is triggered over 
a state law claim if a federal issue is “(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, 
(3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting 
the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”74 A divided panel of the Texas 
Court of Appeals held that while Minton’s claim involved a federal issue that 
was necessarily raised and actually disputed, it was not substantial enough to 
meet the Grable test.75 Additionally, if federal courts possessed exclusive subject-
matter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims requiring application 
of federal patent law, the federal-state balance would be disrupted.76 The Texas 
Court of Appeals then affirmed the trial court’s decision.77 On appeal, the 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Tex. 2011) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 65. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1062–63; Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 638. 
 68. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. 2013), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). 
 74. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063, 1065. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1063. 
 77. Id. 
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Supreme Court of Texas reversed, noting that the determination of the 
experimental use exception was the crux of the state claim and federal courts are 
“well-versed in that subject matter.”78 
After applying the Grable test, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the claim 
should stay in state court.79 While the resolution of a federal patent question 
was “necessary” to Minton’s case and was “actually disputed,” it was not 
“substantial.”80 The Court explained that for an issue to be “substantial,” it must 
be important to the federal system as a whole.81 Here, the backward-looking 
nature of a malpractice claim prevented a change to the status of Minton’s 
patent.82 His patent would have remained invalid even if the state court would 
have found that the experimental use argument could have succeeded.83 The 
Court also dismissed the concern that a state court determining a patent 
malpractice claim would undermine the development of a uniform body of law, 
because a federal court is not bound by a state court’s decision regarding a 
hypothetical case-within-a-case malpractice claim.84 Additionally, the federal 
courts’ greater familiarity with patent law is not such a significant factor to 
trigger federal jurisdiction.85 Without a substantial federal issue, the Court held 
that removing the claim from state court would also disrupt the balance of 
federal and state judicial responsibilities.86 
3.  Blaming the Bean—Monsanto v. Bowman 
The sole question before the Court in Monsanto Co. v. Bowman was whether 
to apply the doctrine of patent exhaustion to self-replicating technologies, such 
as seeds.87 Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, an authorized sale of a 
patented item terminates all patent rights in that item and allows the purchaser 
to use or resell that item.88 
Monsanto owned patents covering Roundup® Ready soybeans, which 
Monsanto or its licensees sold to growers under a limited use license.89 The 
limited use license allowed each grower to sell the second-generation seeds, or 
progeny seeds, to local grain elevators to be used as feed or as a commodity 
grain.90 Saving the progeny seeds or selling them elsewhere violated the limited 
use license.91 Vernon Bowman, a grower, purchased commodity soybean seeds 
from a local grain elevator.92 Bowman hoped that some of these commodity 
 
 78. See Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 646–47; Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063–64. 
 79. See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065–68. 
 80. See id. at 1066. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 1066–67. 
 83. See id. at 1067. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 1068. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).  
 88. See id. at 1766. 
 89. Id. at 1764. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. at 1765. 
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seeds were second-generation patented soybean seeds, which would allow him to 
obtain patented soybean seeds at a much lower price than buying them from 
Monsanto.93 Bowman planted the commodity seeds and grew soybeans, with 
some being third-generation patented soybean seeds.94 Bowman harvested and 
saved the third-generation patented soybean seeds for future plantings.95 
Monsanto sued for patent infringement, and Bowman raised the patent 
exhaustion defense, arguing that the local grain elevators were sold the soybeans 
without restrictions.96 Therefore, any patent rights to the soybeans and their 
progenies were exhausted.97 The district court held that patent exhaustion did 
not apply because the third-generation seeds were newly infringing articles and 
were never sold.98 Therefore, patent exhaustion could not apply to the third-
generation seeds. Additionally, it held there was never an unconditional sale to 
trigger patent exhaustion because the second-generation seeds were never 
authorized to be sold for replanting.99 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Monsanto and found that patent exhaustion 
did not bar Monsanto’s infringement claims.100 The court held that even if 
Monsanto’s patent rights in the second-generation seeds were exhausted by the 
authorized sale to grain elevators, an authorized sale conveys only the right to 
use the article, not the right to make a newly infringing article (i.e., the third-
generation seeds).101 Additionally, it held the third-generation seeds were newly 
infringing articles and did not “substantially embody” the second-generation 
seeds.102 The court noted that to hold otherwise would eviscerate the rights of 
one who owns patents in self-replicating technologies.103 
On appeal, Bowman acknowledged that the exhaustion doctrine does not 
allow a purchaser to make a new product.104 However, Bowman argued that his 
activities fell within “use” of the seeds, since he only planted the seeds as any 
normal farmer would do.105 It was the seeds that replicated to make the new 
product.106 The Supreme Court rejected this “blame the bean” defense and 
noted that Bowman was not a passive observer of the seeds’ multiplication.107 
Rather, Bowman was an active participant in the beans’ reproduction.108 The 
Court agreed with the Federal Circuit and held that patent exhaustion does not 
 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (S.D. Ind. 2009). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 101. See id. at 1347 (citing Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1241, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); id. at 1348 (citing Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 102. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1346. 
 103. See id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 104. See Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1768 (2013). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 1768–69. 
 108. See id. at 1769. 
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allow Bowman to reproduce the patented soybeans.109 The Court noted that to 
hold otherwise would provide little benefit to Monsanto’s patent and would 
deprive Monsanto of its monopoly.110 The Court limited the holding to self-
replicating seeds and acknowledged that self-replicating products are becoming 
more prevalent, complex, and diverse.111 Determining whether patent 
exhaustion applies to self-replicating products that reproduce outside of the 
purchaser’s control or that might be an “incidental step in using the item for 
another purpose” was left for another day.112 
4.  Differentiating Between Genes—Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. 
With its issue often summarized as whether a corporation can own someone’s 
genes, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.113 received 
widespread media attention.114 The real issue was, in fact, more tedious than the 
media described. The Court considered whether isolated human genes and 
synthetic genes are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.115 
The patents at issue related to isolated and synthetic human genes (and 
associated mutations) that were connected with a predisposition to breast and 
ovarian cancers (BRCA genes).116 Myriad was the exclusive licensee of patents 
relating to isolating the BRCA genes and to synthetically creating DNA found 
within the BRCA genes.117 The declaratory action filed sought a declaration that 
claims relating to the BRCA genes were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.118 The 
district court held that claims relating to isolated human genes and synthetic 
genes were invalid because they covered products of nature.119 The Federal 
Circuit reversed, holding that both were patent eligible under § 101.120 
On appeal, the Court considered Diamond v. Chakrabarty121in its analysis, 
stating that the “Chakrabarty bacterium was new ‘with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature.’”122 The Court distinguished 
Chakrabarty with the facts of this case, stating that Myriad did not create 
anything with its discovery of the isolated BRCA genes.123 The Court noted that 
while isolating the gene was very important and useful, isolated genes are not 
patent eligible under § 101.124 It did hold, however, that synthetic genes do 
 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. at 1765. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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meet the demands of § 101 because they are not a “product of nature.” Instead, 
synthetic genes are created by a lab technician.125 
After its unanimous holding, the Court noted what was not implicated by its 
decision.126 First, the Court explained that its opinion did not include method 
claims.127 Myriad “could possibly have sought a method patent” if it had 
discovered a different method of influencing genes in its search for the BRCA 
genes.128 Second, Myriad was able to seek patent protection “on new 
applications of knowledge” related to the BRCA genes.129 Finally, no opinion 
was provided regarding whether alteration of the genetic code satisfies the 
burdens of § 101.130 
This decision is considered something of a compromise. While the 
Association for Molecular Pathology characterizes the ruling as one that will “lay 
the foundation for continued research and application of diagnosis and 
treatment of diseases at the molecular level,” Myriad considers it as underscoring 
the patent eligibility of its method claims and ensuring its strong intellectual 
property protection.131 
B.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS 
1.  Is That Your Final Answer?—Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp. 
In Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., the Federal Circuit, en banc, 
decided whether 28 U.S.C. § 1295(c) grants jurisdiction to entertain appeals 
from patent infringement liability determinations when the issue of willfulness 
has not been decided and when a trial on damages has not yet occurred.132 
Section 1295(a), which is known as the final judgment rule, gives jurisdiction to 
the Federal Circuit over “any appeal from a final decision of a district court of 
the United States.”133 However, not all decisions must be final. Section 1295(c) 
carves out an exception and allows the Federal Circuit to hear an appeal made 
from a judgment that is “final except for an accounting.”134 The decision in Robert 
Bosch hinged on whether, under section 1292(c)(2), the meaning of “accounting” 
includes a trial on damages and a determination of willfulness.135 
Robert Bosch and Pylon Manufacturing were involved in patent infringement 
litigation when Pylon, during the pretrial period, requested that the district 
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court bifurcate the liability and damages issues.136 The district court granted the 
motion and stayed discovery on damages, including willfulness.137 After the 
court found infringement, Pylon appealed the judgments on infringement and 
patent validity.138 Bosch moved to dismiss Pylon’s appeals and argued that 
because damages and willfulness had not been determined, the Federal Circuit 
lacked jurisdiction.139 
The Federal Circuit first considered whether “an accounting” includes a 
damages determination.140 The court reviewed the historical common-law and 
statutory interpretation of an “accounting” and found that while an accounting 
was historically available in equity, a trial on damages was not precluded from 
the “accounting” described in section 1292(c).141 In a seven-to-two split, the 
court provided four points in support of its holding.142 First, section 1292 was 
revised in 1948 to expand the court’s “jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals 
from cases in equity to ‘civil actions for patent infringement which are final 
except for accounting.’”143 Second, a damages trial now decides the issues that 
were once decided in accountings.144 Third, the reason for implementing the 
section 1292(c) exception—the high cost of an accounting—applies to today’s 
modern damages trial, which is “notoriously complex and expensive.”145 Finally, 
the court has heard appeals in similar situations since 1984.146 
Next the court considered whether an accounting included the determination 
of willfulness.147 With a five-to-four split, the court determined that an 
accounting included the determination of willfulness when Congress enacted 
section 1292.148 Since then, multiple appellate courts have found that 
willfulness is decided in an “accounting.”149 Therefore, the Federal Circuit has 
jurisdiction over appeals from patent infringement liability when willfulness 
issues remain undecided.150 
Appealing an infringement and validity judgment while avoiding a damages 
trial and a determination of willfulness is expected to reduce the cost of 
litigation, at least in the first trial. An alleged infringer may now receive 
appellate review regarding a finding of infringement before incurring the 
expenses relating to a damages trial. 
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2.  One More Way to Avoid Induced Infringement Liability—Commil USA, LLC v. 
Cisco Systems, Inc. 
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered 
whether “evidence of a good-faith belief of [patent invalidity] may negate the 
requisite intent for induced infringement.”151 Commil sued Cisco for patent 
infringement relating to protocols in wireless communication systems.152 Cisco 
was found liable for direct infringement, and Commil was awarded $3.7 million 
in damages.153 Cisco was also found liable for induced infringement, and 
Commil was awarded $63.7 million in damages.154 Cisco appealed, arguing that 
the district court should have allowed Cisco to present evidence supporting its 
good-faith belief of invalidity to support its lack of requisite intent required for 
induced infringement.155 The Federal Circuit agreed with Cisco that a patent 
infringer should be able to present evidence relevant to a good-faith belief of 
invalidity.156 The court noted that “it is axiomatic that one cannot infringe an 
invalid patent.”157 Although, a good-faith belief does not preclude a finding of 
induced infringement, it should be considered when determining an infringer’s 
requisite intent.158 
That a good-faith belief of non-infringement can be used to rebut the 
required intent of induced infringement was already established.159 The court’s 
opinion in Commil establishes another avenue for escaping liability under 
induced infringement—a good-faith belief of invalidity.160 
3.  Rule 11 Sanctions Are Not a Myth—Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovation, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovation, Inc. 
is considered good news for defendants facing unreasonable patent infringement 
claims.161 Some hope that this decision, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
upcoming decisions regarding the recovery of attorney’s fees, will curb abusive 
patent litigation.162 Raylon addressed whether a patentee’s conduct should be 
reviewed using a subjective or objective standard when determining Rule 11 
violation issues.163 The Federal Circuit held that an attorney, under Fifth 
Circuit law, is measured by an objective standard of reasonableness.164 
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Additionally, the court concluded that a patentee’s litigation motives have “no 
place in the Rule 11 analysis.”165 
Raylon sued Complus for direct patent infringement and argued that the 
claim element relating to a “display pivotally mounted on said housing” should 
be interpreted as a “display that is mounted on the housing and can be pivoted 
relative to the viewer’s or user’s angle of visual orientation.”166 In essence, any 
fixed-mounted screen held by a user would meet Raylon’s proposed claim 
element because the user could pivot the device by bending her elbow or 
wrist.167 Complus notified Raylon multiple times regarding Raylon’s possible 
violation of Rule 11.168 Regardless, Raylon maintained its position.169 Complus 
eventually filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions.170 At a consolidated hearing, the 
district court rejected Raylon’s interpretation of the pivotally mounted display 
and granted summary judgment in Complus’s favor, but denied the motion for 
Rule 11 sanctions against Raylon.171 In evaluating the Rule 11 motion, the 
district court looked to (1) whether it was clear that the case lacked any credible 
infringement theory and (2) whether it had been brought only to coerce a 
nuisance value settlement.172 The district court focused on Raylon’s past 
settlements and its damages model in determining whether Raylon was 
attempting to recover a nuisance value settlement or had a “good faith 
nature.”173 The district court held that it was “not a situation where ‘the cost of 
the litigation is more of a driving force than the merits of the patent-in-suit’” and 
denied the motion without evaluating whether there was a credible infringement 
theory.174 Complus appealed, arguing that in the Fifth Circuit, an objective 
standard, not a subjective standard, is used to determine whether Raylon’s 
conduct was reasonable.175 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Complus that Raylon’s motivation was not 
relevant in determining Rule 11 sanctions.176 The Federal Circuit then applied 
the objective reasonable standard and found that Raylon’s claim construction 
was frivolous.177 The court noted that there “is a threshold below which a claim 
construction is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable litigant could believe it 
would succeed.’”178 Here, neither the intrinsic evidence nor the prosecution 
history supported Raylon’s claim construction argument.179 Instead, every claim 
required a “display being pivotally mounted on said housing.”180 In essence, 
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Raylon was proposing a claim construction outside any standard canons of claim 
construction and one that “no objectively reasonable litigant . . . would believe 
its claim construction could succeed.”181 The Federal Circuit remanded the case 
for the district court to determine an appropriate sanction.182 
C.  THE PATENT LAW TREATIES IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 2012 
On December 18, 2012, Congress enacted the Patent Law Treaties 
Implementation Act of 2012 (PLTIA) to harmonize United States law with the 
Hague Agreement Concerning International Registration of Industrial Designs 
Hague Agreement and the Patent Law Treaty.183 The U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) has implemented changes due to the Patent Law 
Treaty separately from changes due to the Hague Agreement. 
The Patent Law Treaty streamlines filing and processing procedures for patent 
applications filed as international applications under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.184 It does not apply, however, to provisional, reissue, design, or plant 
applications.185 For example, a filing date will be given to some applications that 
lack a claim, drawing, or specification if an applicant files the application “by 
reference.”186 The Patent Law Treaty also makes it easier for an applicant to 
extend his or her right of priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a).187 The applicant 
must only show an “unintentional” delay in complying with time periods or 
formality requirements.188 Previously, the delay must have been 
“unavoidable.”189 These changes took effect on December 18, 2013.190 The 
USPTO encourages applicants to consider most of the changes as providing 
additional safeguards during the patent prosecution process.191 
The Hague Agreement facilitates protection of design patents by allowing an 
applicant to file “a single, standardized [international design] application in a 
single language” for protection in the countries that are members of the Hague 
Agreement.192 The process is often considered analogous to the Madrid Protocol 
process for trademarks.193 Specifically, the PLTIA loosens the restrictions 
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regarding who can file an international design application with the USPTO and 
clarifies the applicant’s right of priority claims.194 The Hague Agreement also 
provides other advantages, such as longer patent terms.195 The design patent 
term is increased a year from fourteen to fifteen years from the date of grant.196 
Additionally, provisional rights in a design patent may be available. In the 
United States, provisional rights may begin at the date of publication of a patent 
application.197 The International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (IB) will publish an international design application.198 
Considering 35 U.S.C. § 154 was amended to include the publication by the IB 
as falling with the definition of “publication” in regards to provisional rights, it 
follows that a published, international application designating the United States 
triggers provisional rights.199 The USPTO has not yet published final rules 
outlining how these changes will be implemented.200 However, these changes 
should result in a more cost effective and efficient method for obtaining design 
patent protection in numerous countries. 
III.  COPYRIGHT UPDATE 
A.  ALLOWING ARBITRAGE—JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. V. KIRTSAENG 
Under the first sale doctrine, the lawful owner of a copyrighted work may 
resell or otherwise dispose of that work without the permission of the copyright 
owner.201 However, section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act prohibits importing 
copyrighted works without the permission of the owner.202 In Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court determined whether the first sale doctrine 
applies to goods manufactured and sold abroad, but then imported into the 
United States.203 
Defendant Supap Kirtsaeng’s family and friends in Thailand shipped him 
foreign edition textbooks that were printed abroad by a John Wiley & Sons 
subsidiary.204 Kirtsaeng then sold these textbooks for a profit, reimbursed his 
family and friends for their expenses, and kept the remainder for himself.205 
 
 194. Changes to Implement the Hague Agreement concerning International Registration of 
Industrial Designs; Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 71880. 
 195. Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012 at § 102, 126 Stat. 1532 (to be codified 
at 35 U.S.C. § 173). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). 
 198. Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs Art. 10, 
July 2, 1999, 2279 U.N.T.S. 156. 
 199. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d). 
 200. Vera Suarez & Alan Herda, The Patent Law Treaties Implentation Act of 2012, 
HAYNESBOONE (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.haynesboone.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Newsletters/Patent%20Law%20Treatie
s%20Implementation%20Act%20-%20Suarez%20and%20Herda.pdf. 
 201. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 202. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1). 
 203. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1355 (2013). 
 204. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d and 
remanded, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
 205. Id. 
2014] Intellectual Property Law 117 
John Wiley & Sons filed suit against Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement, 
claiming that Kirtsaeng violated section 602(a)(1) by importing the copyrighted 
foreign edition textbooks.206 Kirtsaeng tried to raise a defense based on the first 
sale doctrine, but the district court found this defense inapplicable to copies 
published outside of the United States.207 
In determining whether the first sale doctrine applies to copies manufactured 
abroad, the Second Circuit first looked to the text of section 109(a).208 Section 
109(a) embodies the first sale doctrine and applies to copies “lawfully made 
under [Title 17].”209 After extensive analysis, the court found this text too 
ambiguous to decide the issue alone.210 Confronted with an ambiguous statute, 
the court adopted an interpretation it found would best comport with section 
602(a)(1).211 The court reasoned that if the first sale doctrine applied to copies 
manufactured and acquired abroad, section 602(a)(1) would lose much of its 
force because copyright holders would no longer be able to control importation 
of their works in the vast majority of cases.212 The court therefore held that the 
“first sale doctrine [applied] . . . to copies manufactured domestically.”213 
The Supreme Court also looked to the language of section 109(a) to 
determine whether “lawfully made under [Title 17]” imposes a geographical 
limitation.214 It found that reading in a geographical limitation resulted in more 
linguistic problems than it solved.215 Instead, the Court noted that a 
nongeographical interpretation combats piracy and gives each word distinct 
purpose.216 The opinion noted that the common-law history of the “first sale” 
doctrine lacked any mention of geography and that a contemporary statutory 
interpretation supported Kirtsaeng’s argument.217 Moreover, reading a 
geographical limitation into the first sale doctrine could disturb current practices 
within libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods 
retailers, and museums.218 The Court found that while the nongeographical 
reading whittles away the protections afforded in section 602(a)(1), nothing in 
the statute guarantees a copyright owner the ability to divide foreign and 
domestic markets.219 
Justices Kagan and Alito wrote separately to note that while omitting 
geographical limitations from section 109(a) is the correct interpretation, the 
Court’s prior holdings substantially narrow the scope of section 602(a)(1) to “a 
fairly esoteric set of applications.”220 Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Scalia 
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dissented and argued that a nongeographical interpretation results in an 
“international exhaustion” of copyrights, which the United States has firmly 
resisted on the world stage.221 
Large publishers that rely on arbitrage to maximize profits in each 
geographical market are greatly disappointed with this decision.222 The decision 
greatly diminished the ability to carve out territorial rights for copyrighted 
material.223 In response, copyright owners could increase prices outside of the 
United States to reduce or eliminate any profit from grey market sellers.224 
Additionally, this decision could incentivize digital textbook use, as the digital 
textbooks are generally leased to a user, which would not trigger the first sale 
doctrine.225 Lastly, section 109(a) could be amended to include a geographical 
limitation.226 
B.  FAIR USE—THE AUTHORS GUILD, INC. V. GOOGLE INC. 
In another significant copyright case, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York determined in The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc. that 
Google’s scanning, storage, and digital display of more than twenty million 
books was protected by the fair use defense under section 107 of the Copyright 
Act.227 The success of a fair use defense is dependent upon the following four 
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality and amount of the portion used in 
comparison to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) how the use effects the 
potential market or the value of the copyrighted work.228 
In Author’s Guild, the court found that Google’s use was highly 
transformative; therefore, the first factor strongly favored a finding of fair use.229 
Specifically, scanning the books transforms them into a “comprehensive word 
index” that allows users to find books.230 By showing only a small portion of a 
book, or a snippet, a user is prevented from accessing the entire book. The use 
of snippets also allows for the checking of citations and selection of a book.231 
Additionally, substantive research relating to word usage and linguistics within a 
wide variety of books is now possible.232 While Google is a for-profit entity, it 
does not sell the digital copies of the books (or the snippets) and does not 
display ads on the pages that contain snippets.233 The second factor also weighed 
 
 221. Id. at 1373. 
 222. Andrew Albanese, What Does Kirtsaeng v. Wiley Mean for the Industry?, PUBLISHERS 
WEEKLY, (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-
news/publisher-news/article/56491-a-textbook-case.html. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 228. Id. at 290. 
 229. Id. at 291–92. 
 230. Id. at 291. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 291–92. 
2014] Intellectual Property Law 119 
in Google’s favor, as the majority of the works are non-fiction and are available 
to the public.234 The third factor weighed slightly against fair use because Google 
scans the entire book.235 However, Google limits the amount of the book shown 
and even blacklists approximately 10% of a book from a user’s view.236 Finally, 
the fourth factor weighs strongly in Google’s favor because users can discover 
and then buy the copyrighted work, which increases the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.237 The court compared Google’s work with an in-store book 
display, which allows patrons and librarians to identify books that they wish to 
purchase.238 In conclusion, the court noted that the digitization of these millions 
of books is beneficial because it preserves out-of-print books, identifies relevant 
books for librarians and consumers, provides a full-text search database, 
increases the accessibility of books for print-disabled and underserved 
populations, generates new audiences, and increases income for authors and 
publishers. Therefore, Google’s actions were found to constitute fair use.239 
IV.  TRADEMARK UPDATE 
A.  FRATERNITIES GET PADDLED BY LACHES—ABRAHAM V. ALPHA CHI OMEGA 
In Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a 
defense of laches can preclude a comprehensive permanent injunction when the 
trademark owner’s delay resulted in prejudice to the infringer.240 Abraham 
created Paddle Tramps in 1961 to manufacture wooden paddles and other 
Greek paraphernalia for fraternity and sorority members.241 Since its inception, 
Paddle Tramps has used the names of different fraternities and sororities in its 
products and its advertisements.242 Prior to receiving any requests for licensing, 
Abraham invested heavily in his business.243 He had to rebuild the Paddle 
Tramps business completely due to two fires and a tornado.244 In 1990, twenty-
nine years after it was created, fraternity and sorority organizations contacted 
Abraham for the first time regarding licensing.245 Abraham received multiple 
letters asking him to become a member of a licensing program.246 Abraham at 
times either ignored these letters or responded with a refusal to enter into an 
agreement.247 Finally in 2007, forty-six years after its creation, thirty-two 
fraternity and sorority organizations (Greek Organizations) sued Abraham for 
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patent infringement and unfair competition in the Southern District of 
Florida.248 The Florida district court dismissed the suit and Abraham then filed 
a declaratory judgment for non-infringement against the Greek Organizations in 
April 2008.249 The Greek Organizations asserted counterclaims for, inter alia, 
trademark infringement.250 
The court granted summary judgment motions regarding Abraham’s 
trademark infringement claims, but the issue of Abraham’s affirmatives defenses 
of laches and acquiescence was put to a jury.251 The jury found that Abraham 
proved his laches defense, proved his acquiescence defense, and that the Greek 
Organizations did not prove their unclean hands counter-defense.252 The district 
court then issued an injunction that allowed Abraham to continue selling an 
infringing project. The court applied the “degree of prejudice of the infringer 
test” and found that Abraham would be substantially prejudiced if he were 
prevented from selling double raised crest backings.253 The court noted that the 
sale of the double raised crest backings “drove his sales of other non-infringing 
products.”254 Using this test, the focus is on “the degree of prejudice the 
defendant would suffer in the event the infringing use is enjoined.”255 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that the “degree of prejudice of the 
infringer test” was the correct test.256 The court held that tailoring an injunction 
to allow Abraham to sell the double raised crest backings, while enjoining him 
from selling products that represent only a small portion of his sales, was 
appropriate.257 
V.  TEXAS LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 
A.  TEXAS UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
Even though the state of Texas is one of the top five forums in which trade 
secrets misappropriation is litigated, it just recently joined the majority of states 
in implementing a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.258 The Texas 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) took effect on September 1, 2013, and will 
apply to trade secret misappropriation that occurs on or after this date.259 Prior 
to the enactment of TUTSA, a trade secret owner looked to Texas common law, 
the Restatement of Torts, the Restatement of Unfair Competition, and the 
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Texas Theft Liability Act for his available legal remedies.260 With the enactment 
of TUTSA, the Texas common law is codified to provide one statutory source 
that details trade secret remedies. Additionally, statute clarifies the definition of 
a trade secret is clarified while providing the award of attorney’s fees and 
broadening injunctive relief.261 
Previously, courts considered the following six factors to determine if 
information qualifies as a trade secret: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the trade 
secret owner’s business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees 
and other involved in the trade secret owner’s business; (3) the extent of 
the measures taken by the trade secret owner to guard the secrecy of the 
information; (4) the value of the information to the trade secret owner and 
to its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the 
trade secret owner in developing the information; and (6) the ease or 
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others.262 
Now, TUTSA defines a trade secret as “information that:  
(A) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use; and (B) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under 
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.263 
This specifically includes “a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential 
customers or suppliers.”264 Notably, TUTSA allows for information that has 
potential economic value to be considered a trade secret.265 Additionally, the 
extent to which the information is known inside and outside of the trade secret 
owner’s business is replaced with whether it is not generally known to people 
who economically benefit from its disclosure.266 Moreover, a trade secret owner’s 
investment in developing the information is no longer a factor.267 Finally, 
confidentiality and privacy policies are now compared to what is “reasonable 
under the circumstances.”268 
TUTSA controls the recovery of attorney’s fees.269 Under TUTSA, the 
prevailing party may be awarded attorney’s fees if a misappropriation claim is 
made in bad faith, a party moves to terminate or resist an injunction in bad 
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faith, or there is a finding of willful and malicious misappropriation.270 
Previously, a party was required to make a claim under the Texas Theft Liability 
Act to recover attorney fees.271 
Under TUTSA, injunctive relief is still available, with an exception relating to 
a material and prejudicial change of position due to the use of the trade secret 
before “acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation.”272 Under 
these exceptional circumstances, the trade secret owner may obtain an 
injunction that allows future use of the information upon payment of a 
reasonable royalty.273 Injunctive relief is now available for threatened 
misappropriation.274 
In summary, TUTSA clarifies and expands the definition of a trade secret, 
details when attorney’s fees may be provided, and allows for injunctive relief for 
threatened misappropriation. With the enactment of TUTSA, companies may 
now look to one body of law to determine their available legal remedies in 
regards to trade secret misappropriation. 
VI.  CASES TO WATCH 
The U.S. Supreme Court will again be quite active in the intellectual property 
field in the upcoming year (i.e., 2014), having granted certiorari in nine IP 
cases.275 In patents, the Court will determine whether computer-implemented 
claims are patent-eligible subject matter in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.276 Alice Corp 
is especially important to maintaining the validity of thousands of business 
method patents held by a large variety of industries. The Court will also review 
the highly anticipated and controversial holding in Limelight Networks v. Akamai 
Technologies, which allows for induced infringement of a patent without 
underlying patent infringement liability.277 The proper standard for evaluating 
indefiniteness will also be considered in Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments.278 
Currently, courts give so much weight to the presumption of patent validity that 
a claim may be considered definite even if “some experimentation may be 
necessary to determine the scope of the claims” and the claim construction “may 
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be formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons 
will disagree.”279 It is possible that the Court will require a more rigorous 
indefiniteness evaluation based on the statutory requirement that “claims 
particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter.”280 As 
mentioned earlier, the Court has agreed to review two cases involving awarding 
attorney’s fees in a patent case, which could help deter unreasonable patent 
infringement claims.281 In trademark, the Court will determine who has 
standing under the Lanham Act, to challenge a food or beverage label as 
misleading or false in POM Wonderful.282 In a highly anticipated copyright case, 
Aereo, Inc. will finally know whether its literal reading of the Copyright Act’s 
“public performance” complies with the copyright law.283 The decision in ABC, 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. could affect all cable providers and the way in which cable is 
streamed over the internet.284 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The IP law developments during the Survey period reflect a wide variety of IP 
issues and will have profound effects on multiples industries, as well as patent 
litigants. For example, the Court’s decision in Bowman has created additional 
certainty in the agricultural biotechnology industry, while the Court’s decision 
in Myriad might affect future research activities relating to human genes. 
Defendant-friendly developments were noted in the Federal Circuit, including 
the ability to potentially avoid a damages trial in Robert Bosch, the development 
of a good-faith belief in invalidity to avoid induced infringement liability in 
Commil, and the award of Rule 11 sanctions for unreasonable claim 
construction arguments in Raylon. Finally, new laws, such as The Patent Law 
Treaties Implementation Act of 2012 and the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
were enacted. In summary, the Survey period was interesting and varied, with a 
large number of issues to be decided within the next year. 
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